R. Morgan Burkett v. PIVP Hotel Management Corp. : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1997
R. Morgan Burkett v. PIVP Hotel Management
Corp. : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Val R. Antczak; Alexander R. Dahl; Parsons, Behle and Latimer; Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant.
Henry E. Heath; George D. Knapp; Strong and Hanni; Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Burkett v. PIVP Hotel Management, No. 970567 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1997).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1081
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
KF'J 
45.9 
.S9 
DOCKET NO. 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
BRIEF 
110 5 ai -eft 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
R. MORGAN BURKETT, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
mvp HOTEL MANAGEMENT CORP., 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 9Wtt4~ 
(960905531CV) 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
PIVP HOTEL MANAGEMENT CORP. 
APPEAL FROM A SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
OF THE HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK, THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COf 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH * 5— D 
AUG 2 8 1397 
:)L 
Val R. Antczak 
Alexander R. Dahl 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
* _ , . .-i£ME COURT 
UTAH 
Henry E. Heath #1441 
George D. Knapp #7567 
STRONG & HANNI 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
R. Morgan Burkett PIVP Hotel Management Corp. 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
R. MORGAN BURKETT, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
PIVP HOTEL MANAGEMENT CORP., 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 970144 
(960905531CV) 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
PIVP HOTEL MANAGEMENT CORP. 
APPEAL FROM A SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
OF THE HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK, THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Val R. Antczak 
Alexander R. Dahl 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
Henry E. Heath #1441 
George D. Knapp #7567 
STRONG & HANNI 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7080 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
R. Morgan Burkett 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
PIVP Hotel Management Corp. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
A. Nature of the Case 2 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below 2 
C. Statement of Facts 3 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 5 
ARGUMENT 6 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DECIDED PIVP'S MOTION AS A 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 6 
II. PIVP, EVEN IF A NONSIGNATORY TO THE AGREEMENT, COULD 
COMPEL ARBITRATION 8 
III. DISMISSAL WAS APPROPRIATE 10 
A. Dismissal was Proper Under the Utah Arbitration Act 10 
B. Dismissal was Proper on the Basis of Comity 12 
IV. RELEASE OF THE LIS PENDENS W A S APPROPRIATE BECAUSE 
THERE IS NO LONGER AN ACTION TO SUPPORT IT 14 
CONCLUSION 14 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES 
Page 
Cases Cited 
Federal Cases 
Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds. Inc.. 975 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1992) 10,11 
Busch v. Dovle. 141 Bankr. 432,1992 LEXIS 5805 (D. Utah 1992) 14 
J.J. Rvan & Sons v. Rhone Poulenc Textile. S.A.. 863 F.2d 315 (4th Cir. 1988) 8, 10 
McBro Planning and Devel. Co. v. Triangle Elec. Constr. Co.. 741 F.2d 342 (11th Cir. 1984) . . 9 
Rodriguez v. Fullerton Tires Corp.. 115 F.3d 81 (1st Cir. 1997) 7 
Sea-Land Serv.. Inc. v. Sea-Land of P.R.. Inc.. 636 F. Supp. 750 (D. Puerto Rico 1986) 11 
Wilson v. Waverlee Homes. Inc.. 954 F. Supp. 1530,1535 (D. Ala. 1997) 10 
Utah Cases 
Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Deck Bradv Svs. Inc.. 731 P.2d 475 (Utah 1986) 1 
Doit. Inc. v. Touche. Ross & Co.. 926 P.2d 835 (Utah 1996) 7 
Hansen v. Kohler. 550 P.2d 186 (Utah 1976) 14 
Jackett v. Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power. 771 P.2d 1074 (Utah App. 1989) . . . 1, 13, 14 
Pan Energy v. Martin. 813 P.2d 1142 (Utah 1991) 12 
Reed v. Davis County Sch. Dist.. 892 P.2d 1063 (Utah App. 1995) 1 
Strand v. Associated Students. 561 P.2d 191 (Utah 1977) 6, 7 
Other Cases 
Mountain Plains Constructors. Inc. v. Torrez. 785 P.2d 928 (Colo. 1990) 11 
-ii-
TABLE OF CONTENTS (con'd^ 
Page 
Statutes Cited 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (1996) 1 
Utah Code Ann. 78-31a-4(3) (1996) 2, 12 
Rules Cited 
Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b) 1, 6, 7 
Utah R. Civ. P. 12(c) 1,6 
-iii 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2-2(3)(j) (1996). This appeal is taken from a final summary judgment and order entered by the 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. When asked to rule on a motion to dismiss on grounds other than provided for in Utah 
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) or 12(c), is the trial court barred from rendering summary judgment after 
considering materials submitted by the parties including their motions, memoranda, and 
supporting exhibits? Moreover, may a party properly raise this issue on appeal which was not 
preserved with a timely objection? 
2. Did the trial court rule correctly in dismissing the case after determining that the 
parties and issues before the court were subject to an arbitration provision contained in a written 
agreement which compels them to arbitration as already ordered by the California court? 
3. Did the trial court correctly order a release of the lis pendens because there is no 
further litigation pending before the Utah court? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether or not an agreement compels arbitration is a question of law which the court 
reviewed for correctness, according no particular deference to the trial court. Docutel Olivetti 
Corp. v. Deck Bradv Svs. Inc.. 731 P.2d 475, 479 (Utah 1986V Reed v. Davis County. Sch. Dist.. 
892 P.2d 1063, 1064 (Utah App. 1995). 
The decision to apply comity to a particular case rests within the sound discretion of the 
trial court; Jackett v. Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power. 771 P.2d 1074, 1075 (Utah App. 
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1989); therefore, the appellate court must determine whether the trial court abused its discretion. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
An interpretation of the following subsection of the Utah Arbitration Act is pertinent to 
the resolution of the issues in this appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-4 (1996) 
(3) An order to submit an agreement to arbitration stays any action or 
proceeding involving an issue subject to arbitration under the agreement. 
However, if the issue is severable from the other issues in the action or 
proceeding, only the issue subject to arbitration is stayed. If a motion is made in 
an action or proceeding, the order for arbitration shall include a stay of the action 
or proceeding. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This case involves a dispute between a terminated employee and his employer. The 
employee seeks to avoid arbitration over a claim related to his employment contract. The 
employer contends that the employee is bound by the arbitration provision. 
The case also involves the question of whether an employee may litigate the same facts 
and issues in multiple forums after the court of one state, the first forum chosen by the plaintiff-
employee, has already ordered arbitration of the complaint pursuant to the employment 
agreement. 
B. Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Plaintiff/Appellant, R. Morgan Burkett ("Burkett"), entered into a written employment 
agreement (the "Agreement") on or about November 12,1987, with Sterling Hotels Corporation 
("Sterling"), a wholly owned subsidiary of Defendant/Appellee, PIVP Hotel Management Corp. 
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("PIVP"). The Agreement contains a provision regarding equitable interests relating to real 
property to which Burkett now claims he is entitled. The Agreement also contains a provision 
requiring arbitration in California regarding any claims arising out of or relating to the 
Agreement. 
On April 30,1996, shortly after he was terminated from his employment, Burkett filed a 
complaint in the Superior Court for the State of California against Sterling, PIVP, and others 
alleging contract and related tort claims. On August 8,1996, Burkett filed a complaint in Utah 
based on the same agreement, but naming only PIVP as a defendant, and not naming his direct 
employer, Sterling, which is PIVP's subsidiary. On. October 3, 1996, i; • ) California and 
Utah, the defendants in these actions, including Sterling and PIVP, submitted motions to compel 
arbitration. On October 24, 1996, the court in Utah ordered a stay of proceedings for sixty days 
pending the outcome of the motion to compel filed in California. On December 9, 1996, the 
California court held a hearing on the matter. On January 15,1997, the California court ordered 
arbitration of the complaint. 
On February 10, 1997, the court in Utah held a hearing to determine PIVP's motion to 
compel Burkett to arbitrate pursuant to the order of the California cour T ilso asked the 
Utah court to dismiss Burkett's Utah action, or in the alternative, to stay proceedings in Utah. 
Both parties having submitted various exhibits and other material supporting their motions, the 
court characterized its ruling a summary judgment and it dismissed Burkett's Utah action. 
C. Statement of Facts 
lurkett is a resident of the state of California. PIVP is a Califoi i lia corporation with 
its principal place of business in California. (R. 1). Sterling is a California corporation with its 
-3-
principal place of business in California. (R. 41). 
2. On or about November 12, 1987, Burkett entered into a written employment 
agreement with Sterling, a wholly owned subsidiary of PIVP. (R. 3, 28, 41). 
3. The Agreement contains a provision regarding equitable interests relating to real 
property to which Burkett now claims he is entitled. (R. 34-35). Burkett's complaint alleges that 
one of the real properties related to the Agreement is the Reston Hotel located in Murray, Utah. 
(R. 4-5). 
4. Regarding arbitration, the Agreement provides as follows: 
Arbitration. [A]ny controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this 
agreement or the making, performance or interpretation thereof shall be settled by 
arbitration in Anaheim, California . . . . " 
(R. 17). 
5. The Agreement states that it is to be governed and construed in accordance with 
California law. (R. 18). 
6. On or about April 22,1996, Burkett was terminated from his employment. (R. 5). 
7. On April 30, 1996, Burkett filed a complaint in the Superior Court for the State of 
California alleging a variety of tort and contract claims. (R. 40-76). In that action, Burkett 
demanded that Sterling and PIVP pay Burkett "the sums determined to be due under [the 
Agreement]." (R. 75). 
8. On August 8, 1996, Burkett filed a complaint in Utah based on the same agreement, 
but naming only PIVP, and not Sterling, as a defendant. (R. 1-19). 
9. On October 3, 1996, in both California and Utah, the defendants in these actions, 
including Sterling and PIVP, submitted a motions to compel arbitration. (R. 23, 227). On 
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October 24, 1996, the court in Utah ordered a stay of proceedings for sixty days pending the 
outcome of the motion to compel filed in the California action. (R. 183-85). On December 9, 
1996, the California court held a hearing on the matter. (R. 293). On January 15, 1997, the 
California court ordered the parties to arbitration. (R. 294-95). Burkett's attempts to appeal this 
order have been unsuccessful. 
10. On March 11, 1997, the court in Utah considered PIVP's motion to dismiss a motion 
for summary judgment and accordingly the Utah court ordered the Utah action dismissed. (R. 
383-84). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In this case, Plaintiff/Appellant Burkett challenges the state and federal public policies 
which favor arbitration agreements and discourage protracted, redundant litigation. 
Defendant/Appellee PIVP urges this court to affirm the ruling below which dismissed Burkett's 
action because the trial court correctly determined that Burkett's claims were subject to the 
arbitration provision in his employment agreement, and arbitration regarding these claims had 
already been ordered by the California court. 
The trial court's consideration of PIVP's motion was procedurally correct. Along with its 
memorandum in support of its motion, PIVP submitted various exhibits such as a copy of the 
employment agreement and a copy of Burkett's California complaint. Burkett responded in his 
opposing memorandum by attaching his own exhibits including a copy of the employment 
agreement and PIVP's responses to interrogatories. Burkett cannot now claim that he was 
surprised or prejudiced by the trial court's consideration of extrinsic materials after Burkett not 
only responded to those materials but submitted his own. The trial court properly treated this 
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matter as a motion for summary judgment. 
In regard to the disputed employment agreement, the trial court correctly found that the 
arbitration provision applied to Burkett's claim which arises out of that agreement. Even if PIVP 
had not been a signatory to the Agreement (which it was), the broadly-worded arbitration 
provision would have applied. Moreover, dismissal of Burkett's action was appropriate because 
the court determined that all issues encompassed by Burkett's claim were subject to arbitration. 
There were no remaining issues to be stayed before the Utah court; therefore, the court 
appropriately dismissed the action. Because there is now no further issue in this litigation 
pending before the Utah court, there is no further foundation to support the lis pendens. 
Accordingly, the release of the lis pendens was appropriate. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DECIDED PIVP'S MOTION AS A MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Burkett makes two procedural arguments relating to the Rules of Civil Procedure. First, 
Burkett asserts that the court lacked the authority to consider matters outside the pleadings. 
Second, Burkett insists that he was not allowed a chance to present materials relevant to a motion 
for summary judgment.1 
It is within the trial court's discretion to consider matters outside the pleadings and 
convert a motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment. See Strand v. Associated 
Students. 561 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1977). The rules specifically provide for conversion where 
the motion is made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim) or Rule 12(c) (judgment 
1
 PIVP asks this court to deny Burkett's invitation to consider these matters which he 
raises for the first time on appeal. 
-6-
on the pleadings). These rules merely state that if the court considers material outside the 
pleadings for these specific types of motions, the matter must be treated as a motion for summary 
judgment. There is no rule which prohibits the court from considering matters outside the 
pleadings for other types of motions such as those related to jurisdiction and process. 
In any event, whether the court characterizes PIVP's motion to dismiss as a 12(b)(6) 
motion or some other type of motion, Burkett cannot claim he was prejudiced by being denied 
the opportunity to respond to the inaterial presented with PIVP's memorandum. Burkett made no 
objection to those materials in his opposition or at the hearing on the matter. Moreover, Burkett 
chose to respond head-on tc I ""IVP's motion and supporting exhibits by submitting his own 
extraneous materials. £££ (R. 186-208 (PL's Mem. In Opp. (accompanied by and citing Ex. A 
(employment agreement) and Ex. B (Def.'s Resp. to PL's Interrogs.))). 
Where a party responds to matters outside the pleadings with materials of its own, the 
party cannot sincerely argue that he was surprised or prejudiced by the court's consideration of 
such matters. See Doit Inc. v. Touche. Ross & Co.. 926 P.2d 835, 838-39 n.3 (Utah 1996) 
("[Conversion to summary judgment] is especially proper.. . where all parties submitted 
extraneous materials and neither plaintiffs nor defendants are prejudiced."); Rodriguez v. 
Fullerton Tires Co.. 115 F.3d 81, 83 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding inclusion of extraneous materials 
with 12(b) motion put nonmovant squarely on notice that court the had option of treating the 
motion as one for * •.«* „: ,ent). 
It is the nature of the motion, not the label, which controls its treatment by the court. 
Strand v. Associated Students. 561 P.2d n 1 (I Jtah 1977), In this case, the trial court 
was faced with extraneous supporting materials submitted by both parties. The court did not rule 
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improperly by considering those materials and deciding the motion on the merits. 
II. PIVP, EVEN AS A NONSIGNATORY TO THE AGREEMENT, COULD COMPEL 
ARBITRATION 
Burkett1 s argues that arbitration with PIVP is not appropriate because PIVP, while it is a 
party to the contract, is not a signatory to the arbitration provision. 
The plain language of the contract compels arbitration between Burkett and PIVP. 
According to the terms of the contract, "any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this 
agreement... shall be settled by arbitration." (R. 17 (employment agreement, If 9(e)). Burkett's 
claim, which specifically seeks to enforce the terms of paragraph 8 of the agreement, falls 
squarely within these broad terms. See J.J. Ryan & Sons. Inc. v. Rhone Poulenc Textile. S.A.. 
863 F.2d 315, 321 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding phrase "disputes arising in connection with" did not 
limit arbitration to literal interpretation or performance of the contract, rather "[i]t embraces 
every dispute between the parties having a significant relationship to the contract regardless of 
the label attached to the dispute"). 
Even if PIVP were not a signatory to the agreement, which it was, it could still compel 
arbitration with Burkett. It should be noted that this is not a case where a nonparty to an 
arbitration agreement is being forced into arbitration against its will. In the present case, PIVP 
consents to and urges arbitration. The only party resisting arbitration is Burkett who specifically 
agreed to arbitrate all claims arising out of or related to the Agreement. However, the law does 
not allow Burkett to avoid arbitration by simply, albeit creatively, naming only PIVP as a 
defendant and not Sterling, his employer.2 
2
 Indeed, had the case not been dismissed, Sterling might well have been a necessary 
party. 
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The California court was persuaded that PIVP was a proper party to arbitration. Several 
other cases support the proposition that nonsignatories to a contract have standing to compel 
signatories to arbitrate claims with them. In McBro Planning and Development Co. v. Triangle 
Electric Construction Co., 741 F.2d 342 (11th Cir. 1984), the court held that the lack of a written 
agreement was no impediment to arbitration. 14 at 344. In that case, an electrical contractor and 
the construction manager each had contracts with a hospital related to a construction project. LI 
at 342. Each of those contracts contained arbitration provisions. 14 at 343. There was no 
contract between the contractor and the manager. Id. The contract between the contractor and 
the hospital even stated that "[njothing contained in the Contract Documents shall create any 
contractual relationship between * * * the Construction Manager [McBro] and the Contractor 
[Triangle]." 14 (quoting the contract). Moreover, the contract between the manager and the 
hospital made no mention of the contractor. 14 
When the contractor sued the manager, the manager asked the court to compel arbitration. 
The court ruled that the dispute had to be arbitrated because the duties the contractor claimed 
were breached by the manager were duties that arose under the manager's contract with the 
hospital. 14 at 344 & n.9 (recognizing necessity for arbitration because the contractor's claims 
were "intimately founded in and intertwined with the underlying contract obligations" and also 
noting the federal policy favoring arbitration). 
In regard to paragraph 8 of the PIVP-Burkett-Sterling contract, the duties Burkett seeks to 
enforce are duties between "Investor," as sole shareholder of Sterling, and Burkett. In other 
words, the duties Burkett wants to enforce are those that arose under the contract between 
Sterling and Burkett pursuant to paragraph 8. Thus, because Burkett's claims against PIVP are 
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"intimately founded in and intertwined with" his claims against Sterling, the other conditions of 
the contract, including the arbitration clause, must be given effect as to Burkett's claims against 
PIVP. Cf. J.J. Rvan & Sons. Inc. v. Rhone Poulenc Textile. S.A.. 863 F.2d 315, 320-21 (4th Cir. 
1988) ("When the charges against a parent company and its subsidiary are based on the same 
facts and are inherently inseparable, a court may refer claims against the parent to arbitration 
even though the parent is not formally a party to the arbitration agreement.").3 
The arbitrability of Burkett's claim should not depend simply on the manner in which it 
was plead. Accordingly, the interrelated nature of the rights and duties of the parties, as well as 
Burkett's expressed intent to arbitrate any controversy relating to the contract, requires Burkett to 
submit to arbitration with PIVP as previously ordered by the California court. 
III. DISMISSAL WAS APPROPRIATE. 
A. Dismissal was Proper Under the Utah Arbitration Act. 
All triable issues in this case are subject to arbitration which has already been ordered in 
the California court. Therefore, under the Utah Arbitration Act, like its federal counterpart, 
dismissal was appropriate. 
The Utah court has not addressed the propriety of dismissal, as opposed to a stay, in the 
context of arbitration agreements. However, federal courts confronted with this issue have held 
that dismissal is the correct action where all triable issues before the court are arbitrable. 
3
 See also Wilson v. Waverlee Homes. Inc.. 954 F. Supp. 1530, 1535 (D. Ala. 1997) 
("Party A is equitably estopped from asserting that Party B is not entitled to invoke the 
arbitration provision of the Party A-Party C agreement since it is not a party to that agreement 
because the very basis of Party A's claim against Party B is that Party B breached the duties 
assigned and ascribed to it by the agreement between Party A and Party C." (internal quotation 
marks and alterations omitted)). 
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In Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds. Inc.. 975 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1992), a former 
employee brought a discrimination action against the employer. 14 at 1163. The employer 
moved to dismiss and compel arbitration. 14 The court ordered the parties to arbitration and 
dismissed the plaintiffs action with prejudice, id. Among other arguments on appeal, the 
plaintiff contended that dismissal with prejudice was contrary to the terms of section 3 of the 
Federal Arbitration Act. 14 at 1164. The court affirmed dismissal of the case suggesting that, 
while a stay would be appropriate if less than all issues were referable to arbitration, "[t]he 
weight of authority clearly supports dismissal of the case when all of the issues raised in the 
district court must be submitted to arbitration." 14; see also Sea-Land Serv.. Inc. v. Sea-Land of 
P.R.. Inc.. 636 F. Supp. 750, 757 (D. P. R. 1986) ("Given our ruling that all issues raised in this 
action are arbitrable and must be submitted to arbitration, retaining jurisdiction and staying the 
action will serve no purpose.").4 
In the present case, the court ruled that the arbitration provision was enforceable. (R. 
416). The court rejected Burkett's assertion that his claims against PIVP were severable from 
issues subject to arbitration with Sterling. Therefore, there were no issues left before the court 
which were not subject to arbitration. Because the court ruled all the issues to be arbitrable, 
4
 The Colorado case cited by Burkett is entirely different and distinguishable from that 
now before the court. See Mountain Plains Constrs.. Inc. v. Torrez. 785 P.2d 928 (Colo. 1990). 
Mountain Plains involved an action based entirely in Colorado. There was no redundant 
litigation already in progress in the court of another state. 14 at 929-30. Moreover, an identified 
issue which was not to be arbitrated remained before the court. 14 at 931 (regarding foreclosure 
of mechanic's lien). Accordingly, the appellate court held that the matter should have been 
stayed. 14 In Burkett's case, the California court has already ordered arbitration of the 
complaint in accordance with the employment agreement; a circumstance not present in the 
Colorado case cited by Burkett. 
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dismissal was appropriate.5 
B. Dismissal was Proper on the Basis of Comity 
The Utah court correctly exercised its discretion by deferring to the California court's 
order compelling arbitration for reasons of comity. "Comity is the principle that a court, for 
considerations of public policy, should defer to a court of another jurisdiction . . . and is a matter 
that calls for the exercise of judicial discretion." Pan Energy v. Martin. 813 P.2d 1142, 1146 
(Utah 1991). 
California is the appropriate forum for this dispute. Burkett is a California resident. 
PIVP is a California corporation with its principal place of business in California. The 
employment agreement was prepared and executed in California and the agreement states that its 
terms are to be construed according to California law. The arbitration provision states that any 
controversies or claims related to the Agreement are to be arbitrated in California. Burkett 
originally chose the California court as his forum. Utah's only interest in this matter is that one 
of several properties is located in Utah. The amount of money to which Burkett now claims he is 
entitled, vis-a-vis that single property, will be fairly adjudicated in California. 
The court should not allow Burkett the opportunity to relitigate his case in every state in 
which a piece of property encompassed by the agreement might be located. Indeed, as a practical 
matter of judicial economy, Burkett should not be permitted to relitigate the same contract and 
arbitration issues which have been raised, briefed, decided, and rejected in the California court. 
5
 According to the Utah Arbitration Act, "[a]n order to submit an agreement to 
arbitration stays any action or proceeding involving an issue subject to arbitration under the 
agreement." Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-4(3) (1996). In this case, the trial court did not issue an 
order to submit an agreement to arbitration. The court dismissed the matter. Therefore, the 
statutory provision, under its express terms, does not apply. 
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To allow Burkett's claims to continue in Utah and other states allows Burkett as many bites at the 
apple as he has jurisdictions in which property related to the Agreement may be situated. 
Recognizing this redundancy, the trial court correctly dismissed Burkett's Utah action on the 
basis of comity.6 
The principle of comity was addressed in Jackett v. Los Angeles Department of Water & 
Power, 771 P.2d 1074 (Utah App. 1989). In that case, the plaintiff, a California resident, was 
injured when the helicopter he was in, owned and operated by a California government entity, 
made an emergency landing in Utah. IdL at 1075. The plaintiff failed to file a complaint in 
California within that state's two year statute of limitations pursuant to the Governmental Claims 
Act. IdL In order to dodge the effect of the California law, the plaintiff filed suit in Utah relying 
on the usual conflict-of-laws analysis and urging the court to apply the statute of limitations of 
Utah which was the forum. 14 
Noting the fact-sensitive nature of the decision to apply comity and that such a decision is 
within the trial court's discretion, the court of appeals explained: "Utah has little interest in 
litigating this dispute. [Plaintiff] is a California resident and [Defendant] is a California 
governmental entity. The fortuitous occurrence of the crash in Utah-is not a compelling reason to 
6
 Courts have focused on a variety of public policy concerns in 
determining whether to extend comity in a particular case. Of 
primary importance is whether the public policies of the forum 
state would be contravened if comity were extended. Other 
reasons articulated by courts for extending comity include: to give 
primary regard to the rights of their own citizens; to foster 
cooperation, promote harmony and build goodwill with sister states 
. . . ; and to prevent forum shopping and avoid practical problems 
involved in enforcing a judgment by one state against another. 
Jackett. 771 P.2d at 1076 (citations omitted). 
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accept jurisdiction." Jacket! 771 P.2d at 1077. Accordingly, the Utah court dismissed the suit 
under the principle of comity by applying the California two-year statute of limitations. Id. 
Similarly, the fortuitous location of the Reston Hotel in Utah is just one small part of a 
much larger case already ordered to arbitration in California. Burkett cannot be heard to 
complain if the Utah court requires him to pursue his remedies in California which is the most 
appropriate forum given the facts of the case, and the jurisdiction Burkett originally chose. 
IV. RELEASE OF THE LIS PENDENS WAS APPROPRIATE BECAUSE THERE IS NO 
LONGER AN ACTION TO SUPPORT IT. 
With no litigation pending before the Utah court, the trial court properly released the lis 
pendens. 
"The sole purpose of recording a notice of lis pendens is to give constructive notice of the 
pendency of the proceeding; its only foundation is the action filed — it has no existence 
independent of it." Hansen v. Kohler. 550 P.2d 186, 190 (Utah 1976). Accordingly, with the 
Utah action dismissed, there is no longer any action filed upon which to support Burkett's lis 
pendens.7 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's order dismissing this case in deference to the California court was 
logical, practical, and just. The parties and the subject matter of their dispute, the employment 
7
 It should also be noted that Burkett's claim in the California action is for money; not 
title or possession of real estate. See (R- 158 (PL's CompL, at 36 (demanding "an order to compel 
defendants Sterling and PIVP to pay to plaintiff the sums determined to be due under . . . 
plaintiffs Employment Agreement"))). Such a claim does not support the filing or maintenance 
of a lis pendens in Utah. See Busch v. Dovle. 141 Bankr. 432, 1992 LEXIS 5805, at *9 (D. Utah 
1992) ("Utah law does not allow for the filing of a lis pendens in cases seeking a money 
judgment."). 
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agreement, are all tied to California. The only relationship to Utah is the coincidental location of 
one of the properties. Therefore, PIVP respectfully asks this court to affirm the judgment of the 
trial court dismissing Burkett's action. 
DATED this J. / day of August, 1997: 
STRONG & HANNI 
a 
Henry E. Heath 
George D. Knapp 
Attorneys for Appellee 
PIVP Hotel Management Corp. 
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